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Different Strokes for Different Folks: Balancing the
Treatment of Employers and Employees in Employment
Discrimination Cases in Courts within the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 1 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 2 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA'')/ and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 4 are legislative attempts to eradicate employment discrimination in the United
States. Following the passage of these acts, both state and federal courts
have developed substantial case law regarding the time requirements for
filing employment discrimination cases and the minimum number of
employees an employer must have to be covered under the above listed
acts.
With regard to time limitations, each act has specific times by which
complainants must file a charge or lose their claim. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that where an act requires filing with an appropriate administrative agency before commencing civil suit, timely filing with the
agency is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but the time limitations are
subject to tolling under equitable principles of law. 5 With regard to equitable tolling of time limitations, state and federal courts have varied as to
which circumstances will persuade them to toll the time limitations.
Some courts have interpreted the requirements for equitable tolling
broadly, allowing more pro-employee holdings. 6 Other courts have been

* Copyright © 2002 Ruben H. Arredondo. This comment is dedicated to my little familyAlicia and Simon.
I. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991 ).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
5. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
6. See Cantrell v. Knoxville Cmty. Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Oshiver v.
Levin, 38 F.3d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1994); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Hornick
v. Borough of Duryea, 507 F. Supp. 1091 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Burton v. United States Postal Serv., 612 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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more strict when dealing with equitable considerations regarding time
limitations, or more employer friendly. 7
Courts have varied in how broadly they define the term "employee"
in deciding whether an employer has the minimum number of employees
to be covered by the act under which the discrimination claim is brought.
Some have strictly interpreted the term "employee." Other courts have
construed the term "employee" more broadly, often including all persons
over which the employer has control.
A survey of case law emanating from courts within the Tenth Circuit
reveals that several courts, at both the state and federal level, are predictably employer friendly in employment discrimination suits. This
Note argues for a more evenhanded approach by courts within the Tenth
Circuit toward employees.
Part II briefly describes the EPA, Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA, and explains the charge filing process. Part III gives the facts, procedural background, and holdings of three cases within the Tenth Circuit.
Two are federal cases dealing with equitable tolling of time limitations in
cases where claimants have been assisted by an attorney and where employer actions have been blamed for a claimants' failure to make a timely
filing. The third, a Utah Supreme Court case, deals with the small employer exemption in state anti-discrimination acts. Analysis of this case
will focus primarily on the dissent's opinion. Part IV argues for broader
interpretations of the applicable act in each case. Specifically, it argues
that the broader interpretation of filing requirements used within other
circuits is the more evenhanded approach, especially given the realities
faced by claimants in employment discrimination suits and the remedial
nature of anti-discrimination laws.
II.

A DESCRIPTION OF FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACTS

This Note deals with four federal anti-discrimination acts: the EPA,
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. A basic understanding of those acts
is necessary to understand the analysis of the courts and this Note. This
part gives a brief description of each statute listing the categories each
protects. It also describes the method for processing charges of discrimination.

7. See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (lOth Cir. 1976); Davis v. Wesley Ret. Cmty.
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1995); Biester v. Midwest Health Servs. Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14350 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1994); Peterson v. Wichita, 706 F. Supp. 766 (D. Kan. 1989); Jones
v. Hodell, 711 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Utah 1989); Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic. Inc.,
994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000).

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
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The Acts

The Equal Pay Act of 1963

The EPA, passed in 1963, established the minimum wage and prohibited gender-based wage discrimination. It states in part: "No employer
having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work ... under similar working
conditions .... " 8
2.

Title VJJ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII was a legislative enactment that came partly in response to
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Title VII created the primary
federal agency responsible for enforcement of the anti-discrimination
acts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Title
VII made it an "unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate ... with respect to [employment], because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin."9 Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 10 An
"employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer." 11
3.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act

In 196 7, Congress passed the AD EA to protect workers forty years
of age and older. 12 The ADEA sought to protect older workers from discrimination based on age in both the hiring and retention process. 13 The
ADEA applies to employers with at least twenty employees. 14 Currently,
there are no federal statutes protecting workers less than forty years of
age from age discrimination.

8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.

29
42
42
42
29
29
29

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 206(d)(l) (1963).
§ 2000e-2(a)( I) (1990).
§ 2000e(b)(l990).
§ 2000e(f) ( 1990).
§ 621 (1967).
§ 621 (1967).
§ 630(b) (1967).
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The Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA, passed in 1990, sought to eliminate "discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." 15 It specifically prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability. 16 A qualified individual is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires." 17 The ADA
defines a disability as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment." 18 The ADA applies to employers who have fifteen or
more employees. 19
B.

Filing a Charge of Discrimination

There are time limitations for filing discrimination claims under the
EPA, Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Parties filing under the EPA
need not file a claim with the EEOC before commencing a private action
in court?0 If a person feels they have been the target of employer discrimination and decides to file a charge under Title VII, the ADA, or the
ADEA, she must first file a charge with the EEOC in order to preserve
her right to a civil suit. 21 The time limitation for filing a claim with the
EEOC is 180 days from the time "the alleged unlawful discriminatory
practice occurred. " 22 However, in deferral states, or in states where the
"EEOC defers to the enforcement efforts of a state agency empowered to
undertake employment discrimination investigations," the filing date is
three hundred days. 23
The purpose of the time limitation is threefold: ( 1) to give notice to
the employer that such a charge has been made 24 , (2) to allow the receiving agency an opportunity to reconcile the parties through mediation, 25
and (3) to prevent the filing of stale claims, where material witnesses,
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(b)(l) (1990).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990)
17. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(8) (1990).
18. 42 U .S.C. § 121 02(2) (1990).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1990).
20. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge, at
http://www.eeoc.gov /facts/howtofil.html (June 10, 1997).
21. See id.
22. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1310 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1999) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1990)).
23. !d. at n.2.
24. See Cantrell, 60 F .3d at 1182.
25. See Dartt, 539 F.2d at 1261.
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and documents are no longer available. 26 In most deferral states, the antidiscrimination acts are based substantially on federal statutes. In employment discrimination cases brought before the Tenth Circuit under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, filing a charge with the appropriate
state or federal agency, or both, is a prerequisite to commencing a civil
suit under either state or federal statutes. 27
Upon receipt of the charge, the reviewing agency has time to assess
and decide whether to pursue the claim on behalf of the charging party or
find that there is no basis for the charge and terminate the investigation? 8
A state agency may forward the claim to the respective EEOC regional
office?9 If the EEOC believes the claim is valid, the EEOC may pursue
relief on behalf of the charging party, pursuing mediation between the
employer and the employee. 30 If within the time allotted, the EEOC finds
that conciliation with the employer is not possible, then the EEOC must
notify the charging party that conciliation efforts have failed and that the
charging party has the right to file a civil claim within 90 days of receipt
of the notice. 31 The notice advising the charging party of her right to sue
is called the "right-to-sue" or "notice-to-sue" letter. 32 In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 33 the Supreme Court held that a claimant must
receive the right-to-sue letter before filing a claim in court. However,
several courts have held that where the charging party subsequently receives the right-to-sue letter after having filed a claim, but before trial,
the subsequent receipt cures the defect. 34 Also, the Supreme Court has
held that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that,
like a statue of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable
tolling. " 35

26. See id.
27. See id. at 13 I 0.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5( e)( I 990).
29. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Filing a Charge, (June I 0, I 997) at
http://www.eeoc.gov /facts/howtofil.html .
30. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Facts about Mediation, (Feb. I I,
I 999) at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/facts.html .
3 I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)( I) (I 990).
32. Jd; see also McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 I U.S. 792,798 (1973).
33. 4 I I U.S. 792 (I 973).
34. See Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1989); Pinkard v.
Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460
F .2d 258 (4th Cir. I 972).
35. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (I 982).
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THREE CASES: BrESTER, DAVIS, AND EXAM CENTER

This part gives the factual and procedural background of three cases
within the Tenth Circuit. Two federal cases, Biester v. Midwest Health
Services 36 and Davis v. Wesley Retirement Community, 37 deal with equitable tolling of time limitations in cases where a claimant has been assisted by an attorney and where employer actions have been blamed for a
claimant's failure to timely file, respectively. Burton v. Exam Center Industrial & Medical Clinic, 38 a Utah Supreme Court case, deals with the
minimum number of employees an employer must have to be covered
under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 39 This Note deals primarily with
the dissent's opinion in Exam Center.
A.

1.

Biester v. Midwest Health Services, Inc.

Factual background

Steven W. Biester was an employee of Midwest Health Services, Inc.
("Midwest") from December 1992 through May of 1993. 40 While employed, he claims that he was sexually harassed by his supervising nurse
from January through March. 41 Residing in a deferral state, Biester filed
first with the Kansas Commission on Human Rights ("KCHR"), which
then forwarded his claim to the regional EEOC office. 42 Subsequently,
Biester requested that the EEOC issue him a right-to-sue letter. 43 Around
the same time, Biester's attorney requested that the EEOC send him the
right-to-sue letter on behalf of Biester. 44 Because of a clerical error on
the part of the EEOC, a letter was sent only to Biester. 45 The letter informed Biester that he was required to file a claim within ninety days of
receipt of the right-to-sue. 46
Though Biester was notified of the letter by the postal service, he
could not remember when he picked up the letter. 47 Biester informed his
attorney that he picked up the letter on October 30, 1993, but postal ser36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1994).
913 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1995).
994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000).
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 34A-5-101 (1994).
Biester, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350, at *4.
!d. at *4.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at *5.
!d.
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vice records showed the letter was picked up on October 22, 1993. Biester was later hospitalized three times for major depression between
April and May of the next year and continued outpatient treatment until
December ofthat year. 48
2.

Procedural history

Biester filed a Title VII claim of sexual harassment against Midwest
on January 26, 1994 in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. 49 Midwest sought dismissal of the claim for failure to timely file
a charge of discrimination. 50 Midwest argued that the right-to-sue letter
was picked up October 22, 1993 and that Biester' s filing was untimely,
having been filed ninety-five days after his receipt of the right-to-sue letter.51 Biester argued that the letter was received on October 30, 1993, and
thus the filing was timely. 52 The court treated Midwest's motion as a motion for summary judgment. 53
3.

The holding

The District Court held that Midwest offered undisputed evidence
that Biester received his notice on October 22. 54 After reviewing the parties' motions and the standards for summary judgment, the court analyzed whether equitable principles allowed Biester's claims to go forward.55 Biester argued that the ninety-day time limitation should be
tolled because of his mental incapacity at the time he received the rightto-sue letter and because of the EEOC's failure to send the letter to his
attomey. 56
The court recognized that courts in general have narrowly defined
exceptions to time limitations for filing employment discrimination
claims. 57 It restated the Tenth Circuit's position on the tolling of time
limitations, saying that they would be tolled in limited circumstances
where the plaintiff had been "lulled into inaction," "actively misled," or
"in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her

48. I d.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Jd.
I d.
Jd.
ld.
Jd.
!d.
!d.
I d.
!d.

at *1-2.
at* I.
at *2.
at *5.
at *7.
at *8.
at *9.
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rights." 58 The court then addressed Hiester's claims of mental incapacity,
reviewing the holdings of other courts that had tolled the time limitation
due to the claimant's mental incapacity. 59 The court recognized that time
limitations could be tolled in some circumstances due to mental incapacity, but held that Hiester's circumstances did not warrant tolling of the
time limitation. 60
In reviewing Hiester's circumstances, the courts focused on Hiester's
representation by counsel rather than his mental incapacity during the
ninety-day filing period. 61 The court stated that the attorney had time to
file, knew ofBiester's receipt of the right-to-sue letter, and relied only on
Hiester's testimony of when the letter was received. 62 The court stated
that other courts had also refused to toll the time limitations "based on
mental incapacity when a plaintiff is represented by counsel during the
limitations period."63 Accordingly, the court dismissed Hiester's complaint for sexual harassment, granting summary judgment to Midwest. 64
B.

1.

Davis v. Wesley Retirement Communities, Inc.

Thefacts

Joyce Davis was an employee of Wesley Retirement Communities
("Wesley"). 65 On June 3, 1992, Wesley accused her of abusing a retirement facility resident. 66 The charge was reported to the Kansas Department of Health and Environment ("KDHE"), which subsequently instituted an investigation. 67 Davis's supervisor and Wesley's administrator,
Mary Stuart, subsequently suspended Davis pending the investigation. 68
Soon after the investigation, Davis was fired on June 18, 1992 for the alleged abuse of a resident. 69 Davis appealed to the KDHE and another
hearing was held on February 18, 1993. 70 During that hearing Stuart tes-

58. !d. at *II (quoting Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1984)).
59. !d. at* I 0-13.
60. /d.at*l3.
61. !d.
62. !d. at *13-14.
63. !d. at *14 (citing Lopez v. Citibank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905,907 (lst Cir. 1987); Moody v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 664 F. Supp. 232, 236 (E.D. N.C. 1987)).
64. /d. at *19.
65. Davis 913 F. Supp. at 1441.
66. !d.
67. !d.
68. !d.
69. !d.
70. Jd.
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tified before a KDHE attomey. 71 Stuart was questioned about Davis's relation to a group of black facility workers. 72 Stuart affirmed that they
"hung out together" and "would stick up for each other"73 because they
"[were] all black."74 Stuart further stated that "these gals come from
lower middle class" and "[ e ]ven some of our very best aides who were
black stuck up for each other no matter what, even when they knew that
that person was wrong." 75 She also believed the black facility workers
"would lie to protect their friends." 76
Soon after the appeal of February 18, KDHE's presiding officer filed
a report in which he noted inconsistent and contradictory evidence relating to abuse and also recognized that the accuser had a record of fabricating claims of abuse. 77 Additionally, he identified a history of animus between Davis and Stuart as well as a history of racial bias by the facility
administration. 78

2.

Procedural history and holding

Asserting that she did not know that she might have been terminated
for racial reasons, Davis filed her first complaint of racial discrimination
with the Kansas Human Rights Commission ("KHRC") and the EEOC in
April 1993. 79 They both denied her complaint as being untimely. 80 The
KHRC, however, reversed its decision and accepted a complaint from
Davis. 81 Davis requested a right-to-sue letter and after its receipt, filed a
civil suit on September 2, 1993 in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas. 82
Wesley moved for summary judgment on Davis's Title VII claim alleging that Davis's suit was untimely filed. 83 Davis did not dispute that
she filed after the three hundred day time limitation. However, she argued that the "300 day limitation for filing her complaint with the KHRC

71. /d.
72. /d.
73. !d.
74. /d.
75. /d.
76. /d.
77. /d. at 1442.
78. !d.
79. /d.
80. /d.
81. /d.
82. /d.
83. /d. at 1440.
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or the EEOC was tolled until [Davis] knew, or should have known, that
the reasons for her termination were racially motivated."x 4
The court held that the time limitation was not tolled from the time
she knew or should have known that the reason for her termination might
have been racially motivated, but from the time the adverse action occurred. 85 In issuing its ruling, the Court cited another Tenth Circuit Court
case, Hulsey v. Kmart, 86 for its proposition that the three hundred day
time limitation would have little meaning if the employer were equitably
estopped whenever it "did not disclose a violation of [Title VII]."x 7 The
court held that the employee had a duty to ascertain whether there was an
unlawful reason for the employment action "[r]egardless of the reasons
advanced by the employer for the employment decision. The mere fact
that the employer gave a non-discriminatory reason for her termination
does not constitute 'active deception. "'88 The court consequently granted
Wesley's Motion for Summary Judgment on Davis's Title VII claims. 89
C.

Burton v. Exam Center Industrial

1. Thefacts
Hubert Burton, M.D. was a sixty-nine year old, part-time physician
with Exam Center Industrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. ("Exam
Center"). 90 In July of 1994, Exam Center president, Howard Boulter,
terminated Burton. 91 Boulter told Burton that the Exam Center had hired
a younger, full-time physician out of necessity and Boulter did not
"know how much longer [Burton as an] older guy[] wanted to work.'m
Burton later filed a charge against the Exam Center with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division ("UADD") alleging age discrimination. 93 The
UADD stated that since the Exam Center had less than fifteen employees,94 it was not covered under the jurisdiction of the UADD nor the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("UADA"). 95
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Jd. at 1442.

!d. at 1443.
43 F.3d 555,557 (lOth Cir. 1994).
Davis, 913 F. Supp. at 1442-43.
Id. at 1443.
Jd. at 1445.
Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1262.

91. Jd.
92. Jd. at 1262.
93. I d. at 1262-63.

94. Under the ADEA, an employer must have twenty employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(1967).
95. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1262-63.
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Procedural history

Burton then filed a claim in trial court alleging that both state and
federal acts support a public policy prohibiting age discrimination and
that such public policy gave rise to the tort of wrongful termination. 96
The trial court initially denied the Exam Center's Motion for Summary
Judgment, but later granted it upon the Exam Center's Motion to Reconsider97 that cited law from the Utah case, Retherford v. AT&T Communications.98 Burton appealed the trial court's decision. 99

3.

The holding

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the UADA did not
assert "a public policy which [was] 'clear and substantial' with respect to
small employers" 100 because the legislature exempted small employers
from coverage under the UADA and any decision to expose small employers to liability for age discrimination was a legislative and not a judi101
cial matter.
The court stated that there were three central reasons for
not allowing a common law claim for wrongful discharge. First, the court
stated that federal and state laws prohibiting age discrimination had as
their common goal "not so much to redress each discrete instance of individual discrimination," but the eradication of the "egregious and continued discriminatory practices of economically powerful organizations.
Thus, they could afford to exempt the small employer." 102 Second, the
laws struck a balance between the desire to protect individual workers
from discrimination and a desire to protect small businesses that would
likely hire people of similar ethnicities, socioeconomic status, etc. 103
Third, the court stated that to expose small employers to a tort claim for
wrongful discharge would invoke the longer time limits of tort claims,
involve costly legal fees, and expose small employers to excessive damages.104 The court, accordingly, affirmed the trial court's grant of Exam
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment. 105

96. !d.
97. !d.
98. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) (holding that the UADA provided the only remedy for the tortious claim of discharge in violation of public policy).
99. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1263.
100. !d. at 1265.
101. Id. at 1266.
102. !d. at 1266-67 (quoting Jennings v. Maralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1082 (Cal. 1994)).
103. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1266-67.
104. !d. at 1267.
105. !d.
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Justice Durham's dissent

Justice Durham, with Justice Stewart concurring, argued that the majority's decision would open a loophole to the UADA, allowing small
employers to discriminate not only based on age, but also on race, gender, religion, and disability. 106 She provided three reasons in favor of the
common law claim of wrongful discharge. First, Justice Durham argued
that the Supreme Court of Utah had allowed public policy exceptions
when they were "so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public
good." 107 Justice Durham argued that the core policy of the UADA was
that discrimination based on age, race, gender, and disability was not in
the public good. 108 The fact that the legislature did not extend coverage
to small employers did not reduce the importance of that core policy; the
legislature clearly intended the UADA to have broad implications. 109
Second, Justice Durham argued that because small businesses constituted almost seventy percent of Utah's employers, the UADA only applied to a small portion of Utah employers, recognizing a common law
claim of wrongful discharge would address the other seventy percent of
employers. 11 Finally, Justice Durham reasoned that the state had a legitimate policy interest in regulating the workplace and prohibiting
workplace discrimination. 111 Prohibiting small employers from discriminating would protect the public interest and protect future economic opportunities and growth for citizens. 112

°

IV.

ANALYSIS

This section focuses on three areas where courts within the Tenth
Circuit should interpret the various anti-discrimination statutes to provide
a more balanced treatment of employees. First, it focuses on circumstances where claimants have been represented by counsel in employment discrimination cases. Second, it concentrates on circumstances
where employer actions have been blamed for a plaintiffs failure to
timely file. Finally, this analysis deals with the small business exemption
in anti-discrimination acts.

106.
107.
I 08.
109.
110.

!d. at 1268.
Jd. (quoting Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,1042 (Utah 1989)).
!d. at 1268.

See id.
!d. at 1269.
111. Jd.
112. See id.
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Assistance of an Attorney

The Biester court reflects a similar approach taken by other courts
within the Tenth Circuit when considering whether to toll the time limitations for plaintiffs who have been assisted by counsel. 113 In Peterson v.
Wichita, Peterson, an African-American claimant, brought a charge of
racial discrimination against the City of Wichita, Kansas. 114 Peterson had
assistance of counsel at some points in the charge filing process. 115 Although Peterson filed his claim after the time limitation ran, 116 he argued
that he was entitled to equitable tolling because of misinformation and
mishandling on the part of city employees, as well as his general ignorance regarding the filing process. 117 The court refused to toll the time
limitation, charging Peterson with constructive notice of Title VII charge
filing requirements. 118 In denying Peterson the tolling of time limitations,
the court stated that where a party claims ignorance of the law and has
been assisted by counsel, there is no basis for equitable tolling. 119
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Company, 120 Anne M. Dartt sued the company
partly for age discrimination. 121 The Dartt court found that Dartt's circumstances merited equitable tolling of the time limitations, even though
she consulted an attorney on two occasions. 122 The court noted that Dartt
promptly followed the advice of the attorneys she consulted and was thus
not sleeping on her rights. 123 The court also observed that the purpose of
the notice requirement inherent in the time limitations was to allow the
administrative agencies responsible for the charge to attempt conciliation
and to provide the employer with notice of the charge. 124 However, in
dictum, the court suggested that it might be inappropriate to grant tolling
113. Compare Peterson v. Wichita, 706 F. Supp. 766, rev'd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 1307
(D. Kan. 1989) (holding that the court had charged a plaintiff with constructive notice of procedural
requirements for filing his complaint with the EEOC and refused to toll time limitations where plaintiff was assisted by counsel) with Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, aff'd 434 U.S. 99, reh 'g denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (lOth Cir. 1976) (stating, in dictum, that tolling would not be permitted where
the attorney slept on clients rights or believed client had none).
114. Peterson, 706 F. Supp. at 769.
115. !d. at 769-70.
116. !d. at 770.
117. !d. at 773.
118. !d.
119. !d. ("Plaintiff is unable to claim ignorance of the law because of his consultation with
legal counsel."). The Peterson court, however, did state that where the actions of the employer are
blamed for delayed filing, the fact that a plaintiff retained legal counsel is not considered when deciding whether to equitably toll time limitations. See id. at 773.
120. 539 F.2d 1256 (lOth Cir. 1976).
121. !d. at 1258.
122. !d. at 1261-62.
123. !d.
124. !d.
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of the time limitations, even when plaintiffs counsel "slept on his client's rights or did not believe he had any under the statute." 125
The Biester, Peterson, and Dartt courts seem to reflect a bright-line
rule that (1) refuses to toll the time limitations where attorney ineptitude
is involved--even where the counsel sleeps on a client's rights, and (2)
looks more closely at whether a plaintiff retained counsel in determining
knowledge of filing requirements than at the actual knowledge and facts
surrounding the plaintiffs charge filing process.
Such a rigid rule within the Tenth Circuit does not properly allow for
the considerations that should be viewed in light of the purpose of state
and federal anti-discrimination laws. First, such a bright-line rule is not
appropriate in "a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers, initiate the process." 126 Though there are some claimants
that might be able to navigate the "web of procedural traps," 127 many will
not know the requirements of filing a charge of discrimination. Those
claimants that live in deferral states will not likely be aware that they
must first file with the state agency before filing with the EEOC. Also,
the state might have different requirements for investigation of charges,
conciliation between the employer and employee, and varying remedies
from the federal statutes. Procedural requirements and terms, like rightto-sue and conciliation, will likely be foreign to many claimants. Many
claimants may find the process too complicated to truly pursue a charge
to its full extent.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bethel v. Jefferson128 recognized that the statutory path outlined by many remedial acts,
such as Title VII, "leave[] much to be desired in clarity and precision" 129
and are "greatly confusing even for lawyers and judges." 130 In Bethel,
two black police officers brought charges of racial and religious discrimination against the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 131 In tolling the time limitation, the Bethel court reasoned that
an act dependent on laymen for initiation should not use strict procedural

125. !d. at 1261 n.4 (quoting Edwards v. Kaiser Alum. & Chern. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195,
2000 (5th Cir. 1975)).
126. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972); see also, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
u.s. 750 (1979).
127. Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
128. !d.
129. /d. at 637 (quoting Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1975)
(en bane)).
130. !d. at 641 (citing Egelston v. State Univ. Coli., 535 F.2d 752,754 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Title
Vll is rife with procedural requirements which are sufficiently labyrinthine to baffle the most experienced lawyer, yet its enforcement mechanisms are usually triggered by laymen.")).
131. !d. at 635.
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and technical requirements to foreclose possible relief. 132 Rather, it reasoned that a court, while observing closely the purpose of requirements
under such remedial acts, should also look closely at the "broad humanitarian and remedial purposes" of federal employment discrimination leg133
The Bethel court stated that the fact that a party might have
islation.
had assistance of counsel at any stage of the filing process "is of no relevance, for the Act must be given a construction rendering its mechanisms
workable in the hands of laymen generally." 134
The fact that laymen are primarily responsible for initiation of the
statutory process for enforcing discrimination laws is only one reason
against a bright-line rule. Another reason is that a rigid rule does not allow for consideration of the circumstances of each case. A rule that
would tend to deny relief to a party, holding them responsible for the actions of counsel, ignores the fact that not all attorneys are adequate.
Some attorneys may be sleeping on a client's rights, others may not have
the client's best interests at heart, and others are no more able to deal
with the filing process than are their lay clients.
Finally, a bright-line rule tends to miss the mark by focusing on the
acts of the attorney when it should focus on the acts of the claimant and
the intent of the statute. The Hiester court, though initially stating that it
would focus on Biester's mental capacity, failed to thoroughly explain
why his mental capacity was not enough to warrant tolling. 135 Its primary
focus was on the presence of counsel throughout the process. 136
Two Sixth Circuit cases, Burton v. United States Postal Service 137
and Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation 138 deal
with circumstances where the plaintiff was assisted by counsel and
missed time limitations for claim filing. In Burton, a postal worker filed a
claim of racial discrimination after being terminated. 139 EEOC requirements stated that the workers must file a written complaint after a discriminatory employment act. 140 Burton filed his complaint fourteen days
late and at trial was ordered to explain why he had not filed in timely

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
13X.
139.
140.

IJ. nt 642.
/J.
ld at 642 n.6 7.

See Beistcr v. Midwest Health Servs. Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14350, at *13-14.
See iJ.
612 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
60 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 612 F. Supp. at 1058.
ld at I 059.
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fashion. 141 Burton stated that he was without counsel throughout the
charge filing process "through no fault of his own." 142
On appeal, the court, in determining whether equitable tolling was
appropriate, compared the Title VII time limitations to other statutory
time limitations and declared that "the basic inquiry is whether congressional purposes [were] effectuated by tolling the statute oflimitations." 143
Instead of finding that Burton was estopped from arguing that his failure
to timely file was due to lack of knowledge of the time requirements because of assistance by counsel, the court looked at the circumstances of
Burton's case. 144 The court found that the plaintiff had pursued his claims
as diligently as possible given his knowledge. 145 The court also looked at
the actions of his attorney. Specifically, the court found that the attorney
failed his client by neglecting to contact his client after consulting with
the EEOC, by neglecting to mail complaints in a timely manner, and by
leaving town without notifying Burton. 146 The court held that punishing
an innocent client for the "irresponsibility of his counsel" would defeat
the remedial purposes of legislation like Title VII and would not defeat
legislative purposes embodied in time limitations. 147
In Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation, the
court dealt with a plaintiff who filed a racial discrimination claim under
Title VII. 148 The lower court held that the time limitations for Cantrell's
timely filing were equitably tolled given the fact that his attorney was
mentally incapacitated. 149 On appeal, the employer argued that equitable
tolling of time limitations was never warranted where attorney negligence was involved. 150 The court stated that Cantrell was not a normal
case of attorney negligence. 151 The court declared that before resolving
whether equitable tolling was appropriate, the case must be remanded to
determine the attorney's mental state during the 180 day filing period as
well as Cantrell's diligence in filing his claim without attorney assistance. 152 The dissent went further, arguing that equitable tolling was
clearly appropriate. 153 The dissent stated that Cantrell had attempted to
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

!d. at 1058-59.
!d. at 1059.
!d. (quoting Jones v. Transohio Sav. Assoc., 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1984)).
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 1059.
60F.3d 1177,1179(6thCir.1995).
!d. at 1179.
!d.
!d. at 1179-80.
/d.at1180.
!d. at 1181.
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contact the attorney on several occasions asking about the claim. 154 In
fact, the attorney had failed to file the claim and later was removed from
active practice owing to his mental incapacity. 155 The dissent reasoned
that because the employer had made no showing of prejudice by
Cantrell's late filing, and Cantrell had acted in good faith and with due
diligence in filing his claim, equitable tolling was clearly appropriate. 156
The previous cases present a broader interpretation of the remedial
purposes of anti-discrimination legislation and a realistic view of the
charge filing process. Instead of holding to a hard and fast rule, as many
courts within the Tenth Circuit do, courts should look to the circumstances surrounding a claimant's untimely filing instead of the presence
of counsel at some point in the process. While recognizing the legislative
intent embodied in time limitations, the courts should also look at the
remedial purposes of anti-discrimination acts. Courts should focus on a
plaintiff's diligence in pursuing his claim, any bad faith evidenced by the
charging party, the complexity of the claim, and the process by which the
plaintiff must pursue his remedies. Lastly, courts should lbok at counsel's actions. If Tenth Circuit courts adopt this approach, employees will
find these courts more willing to consider the remedial purposes underlying anti-discrimination laws and less willing to foreclose remedies to lay
employees.

B.

The Acts and Omissions of Employers

In most employment discrimination cases, the adverse employment
action and knowledge of discrimination occur simultaneously. However,
in some instances, such as was the case in Davis, knowledge of the discrimination will not be evident until some later time. The rule pronounced in Davis allows employers in such circumstances to conceal
discriminatory pretext for adverse employment decisions and makes it
more difficult for plaintiffs to find relief for employment discrimination
within courts of the Tenth Circuit. 157 Davis held that regardless of the
reason the employer advances for the employment action, "the employee
still has a duty to determine whether there was a discriminatory motivation for the employment decision." 158 The Davis court stated that even if
154. /d.
155. !d. at 1180 n.l.
156. !d. at 1182.
157. See Davis. 913 F. Supp. At 1442-43; but see Jones v. Hodel, 711 F.Supp. 1048 (D. Utah
1989) (holding time period begins to run when facts that would support a claim of discrimination
would have been apparent to similarly situated person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
rights. The court in Jones stated that to toll the time limitation, the employer must have actively engaged in some deception to prevent the employee from filing.)
158. Davis v. Wesley Ret. Cmty.lnc., 913 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (D. Kan. 1995).
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the employer did terminate for discriminatory reasons, that reason need
not be declared to the employee. 159 The core question as to when the time
limitation starts to run was not "notice or knowledge of the discriminatory motivation" but "knowledge of the adverse employment decision."160
This rule places an impractical burden on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
is charged with constructive notice of any discriminatory reason once an
action is taken, even if the employee has no knowledge or supposition of
discriminatory pretext at the time of the action. For many employees this
will mean divining whether an employer has discriminated. Employees
will learn of discriminatory acts from either other employees, which may
or not be amiable towards the plaintiff, or from an employer who has already taken adverse employment action against the employee. This burden would of course be placed on a claimant without the aid of the discovery process.
The Davis rule places more focus on employer protection and less
emphasis on the purpose of remedial legislation like Title VII, the ADA,
the ADEA, and the EPA,which is to end a history of egregious employment discrimination in this country. The impractical burden on the plaintiff effectively serves to promulgate employer discrimination and concealment. The employer can then mislead the employee as to the true
cause of the action and thus lull the employee into inaction. Despite this
misrepresentation, the employee would have the duty of discovering the
concealment placed on the employee.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt with this issue in
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 161 where a female attorney
filed a charge of gender discrimination against her former law firm. Initially, Sherry J. Oshiver applied for a position as an associate attorney
with the firm. 162 The firm hired her on an hourly basis, stating that it did
not have a salaried position available, but that if one opened up the firm
would consider hiring her. 163 The firm soon terminated Oshiver, stating
that the firm did not have sufficient work to employ her on an hourly basis.164 Oshiver applied for unemployment benefits months later. 165 At a
benefits hearing, Oshiver discovered that the firm had hired a male attorney to replace her shortly after her termination. 166 The lower court dis159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Jd.
Jd. at 1443 (quoting Hulsey v. Kmart Inc., 43 F.3d 555,558-59 (lOth Cir. 1994)).

38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).
Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1383.
!d. at 1384.
Jd.
Jd.

Jd.
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missed Oshiver's complaints for discriminatory refusal to hire and discriminatory discharge as untimely and granted the firm's Motion for
167
Summary Judgment.
On appeal, the court reversed the Motion for
Summary Judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim. 168 In Oshiver,
the court stated a rule contrary to that espoused in Davis. The court held
that the trigger date for the time limitation was not the date of the adverse
employment action, but the date that "the plaintiff discovers that he or
she has been injured." 169 The court further explained that the date a claim
accrues is the time from which the plaintiff knows or should have reasonably known of the discriminatory action. 170
The Oshiver court reasoned that it would be unjust to allow an employer/defendant to benefit from its own misleading acts or omissions. 171
The time period should be tolled where the employer lulled the employee
into inaction or misled the employee as to the reasons for the termination, thereby causing the plaintiff's untimely filing. 172
Applying the Oshiver rule in courts within the Tenth Circuit would
recognize the realities faced by an employee when attempting to obtain a
remedy for discriminatory employment actions. It recognizes the core
policy behind anti-discrimination legislation-the elimination of workplace discrimination. The Oshiver rule provides greater incentive for an
employer to not conceal discriminatory reasons for employment decisions. By exposing a deceptive employer to possible claims in the future
by employees who subsequently discover discriminatory pretext. Oshiver
also places the burden of ensuring non-discrimination on the employer
rather than the employee. If the Tenth Circuit applied a rule like that propounded in Oshiver, employees would be afforded greater protection
from employers' discriminatory acts.
C.

Counting Employees

There are four approaches courts may consider when computing the
number of employees to determine coverage under a particular antidiscrimination act. Three of those approaches are based on established
case law and the fourth is based on core policy principles underlying federal anti-discrimination acts. Any of those approaches could be employed
in the Tenth Circuit to allow for broader interpretations to fairly balance

167.
168.
169.
170.
1986)).
171.
172.

/d. at 1383.
!d.
!d. at 1385.
!d. at 1386 (citing Ohemeng v. Delaware State Coli.. 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del.
/d. at 1387.
See id. at 1389.
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the treatment of employers and employees in employment discrimination
cases.

1.

The public policy exception

The majority's analysis in Exam Center focused primarily on Burton's state law claim as a UADA claim. 173 As a state law claim, the
UADA provided the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge. The majority then used the requirements and background of the UADA to guide
its analysis. 174 The majority ultimately held that no public policy exception to the UADA allowing for a tort of wrongful discharge against an
employer with fewer than fifteen employees should be adopted, especially where the legislature had expressly exempted small employers
from coverage. 175
The dissent suggested that instead of focusing primarily on the
UADA as the exclusive remedy for age discrimination, the primary focus
should be on the public policy exception framework presented by the
Utah Supreme Court in Berube v. Fashion Center Limited. 176 The dissent
suggested that clear public policy reasons existed for treating Burton's
age discrimination claim, not as a strict UADA claim, but as a tort for
wrongful discharge. 177
In Berube, the Supreme Court of Utah reasoned that public policy
exceptions should be implemented where there are interests "so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their
importance for promotion of the public good." 178 The Durham dissent argued that an exception in this case would recognize that protection
against employment discrimination was a substantial and fundamental
right that promoted the public good of all workers in Utah. 179 The Durham dissent also cited other state court decisions, 180 arguing that the heart
of the public policy exception was the rationale behind both state and
federal anti-discrimination acts, noting the eradication of the "detrimental effects of employment discrimination on the public interest." 181 A

173. Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1263-64.
174. !d.
175. !d. at 1267.
176. 771 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989).
177. See Exam Center, 994 P.2d at 1268-69.
178. !d. (quoting Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042).
179. !d. at 1269.
180. !d. (citing Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996)). The dissent also cited
other courts for the proposition that though there were small business exemptions, the small businesses were not exempt from the overall intent behind the state anti-discrimination acts. See id. at
1270.
181. !d. at 1270.
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public policy exception allowing for a tort of wrongful discharge in state
courts within the Tenth Circuit would place greater focus on the remedial
purposes of the anti-discrimination acts. This would allow all employees,
including those of small employers, opportunity to seek redress for employment discrimination.
However, a major concern with the dissent's proposition is the increased liability a small employer would face with a tort of wrongful discharge. Under the UADA, employers receive the benefits of notice requirements, shorter time limitations, and an administrative process that
attempts conciliation between the employer and employee. 182 In addition,
a state administrative process, if successful, can be less costly than a protracted legal battle. A tort of wrongful discharge would doubly burden
small employers by giving them none of the benefits of the UADA and
exposing them to expensive legal fees when faced with a charge of discrimination.
A better approach would be to strictly limit the public policy exception and not allow a common law cause of action for all discrimination
cases. The exception would apply only to the employee minimum, allowing employers with less than the minimum number of employees required to be covered by the UADA. Allowing a claim of discrimination
to proceed under the UADA would better balance the purpose of state
acts like the UADA, while still providing the protection small employers
need from the burden of employment discrimination litigation.

2.

The economic realities test

Many courts have expanded the coverage of federal antidiscrimination statutes by employing the "economic realities" test in determining whether an employer meets the threshold requirement for the
minimum number of employees. 183 Rather than looking at technical
terms, such as "manufacturing representative," "volunteer," and even
"independent contractor," these courts look to the economic realities of
the relationship between the principal and the agent. 184
In McClure v. Salvation Army, 185 the Fifth Circuit dealt with a gender
discrimination claim brought by a female agent of The Salvation

182. !d. at 1267.
183. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns. Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944); Christopher v. Stouder Mem'l.
Hosp., 936 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1991); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Neffv.
Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
184. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972); Armbruster, 711
F.2d at 1335.
185. 460 F.2d at 554.
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Army. 186 The court eventually held that McClure's claim could not be
maintained because The Salvation Army was a religious organization
and any regulation by the government would be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of church and state; however, the court, in probing the terms of the employment contract, determined that McClure was
an "employee," despite that fact that her "employer" considered her a
volunteer. 187 The court stated that semantics in terms of employment or
in employment contracts should not "be used to waive protections
granted to employees by an Act of Congress." 188 Rather, the court held
the main focus should be on the particular facts of each case and factors
such as whether the agent was "selected, employed, controlled, trained,
and paid" by the principal. 189
A similar approach was taken by the Sixth Circuit in Armbruster v.
Quinn. 190 The court dealt with sexual discrimination charges brought by
two females against their employer. 191 The district court had dismissed
their claims, holding that the employer did not meet the employee minimum since their "manufacturing representatives" did not qualify as employees.192 On appeal, the court noted that particular labels an employer
might ascribe to its agents were not determinative of whether they were
covered under Title VII, but rather the "economic realities underlying the
relationship between the individual and the so-called principa1." 193 The
court observed that the purpose of congressional acts like Title VII was
to remedy harms to workers in general, and the term "employee" should
be construed broadly in light of the individuals they were to protect. 194
The court also observed that after Supreme Court decisions holding that
independent contractors were covered under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), Congress specifically amended the NLRA to exclude independent contractors. 195 This occurred before the passage of the
Title VII. 196 The court further reasoned that Congress had failed to exclude particular types of employees, like manufacturing representatives

186.
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188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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196.

McClure, 460 F.2d at 455.
ld. at 557.
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Jd.
711 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 (6th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 1334.
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!d. at 1340.
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and independent contractors from coverage, further evincing an intention
for a broad reading of the term "employee." 197
In Hornick v. Borough of Duryea, 198 a federal district court in Pennsylvania dealt with a sex discrimination charge filed by a temporary female employee of the borough police force. 199 The employers contended
that the police force did not have the requisite number of employees to
be considered an employer. 200 Specifically, the issue was over two parttime workers and ten Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
workers? 01 The borough argued that it did not fit under the Title VII
definition of "employer," because it did not have the requisite number of
employees? 02 The Hornick court cited the opinions of other courts that
had similarly dealt with the issues of part-time workers as employees and
held that part-time workers did qualify as employees under Title VII. 203
The court also held that the Act was intended to cover not only part-time
workers, but also seasonal workers. 204 The broadened interpretations of
the term "employee" in McClure and Hornick allow for protection of
more workers exposed to unlawful employment practices. The focus
should not be on the labels assigned agents or on technical readings of
remedial acts, but on the true relationship between the principal and
agent. This focus allows for an interpretation that would provide protection for all workers intended to be covered by the congressional acts.
Such a focus in courts within the Tenth Circuit would also provide
greater remedies for employees that suffer employment discrimination.
3.

The payroll method of counting

Another definitional aspect of the term "employee" was addressed in
Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. 205 Several circuit
courts were at odds as to the method for counting employees for the purpose of determining whether a company qualifies for the small business
exemption to Title VII and the ADEA. Some circuits used the counting
method, in which salaried workers were counted "as employees for every
day of the week they [were] on the payroll" and "hourly paid workers
197. !d.
198. 507 F. Supp. I 091 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
199. !d. at 1093.
200. !d.
201. See Hornick, 507 F. Supp. at 1098.
202. Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1990).
203. Hornick, 507 F. Supp. at 1098.
204. !d. at l 098.
205. 519 U.S. 202 (1997).
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[were] counted as employees only on days when they [were] actually at
work and on days of paid leave." 206 Other circuits used a payroll method
that focused on "whether an employer has employment relationships
with fifteen or more individuals for each working day in twenty or more
weeks during the year in question." 207 The United States Supreme Court
resolved the split in Walters by holding that the payroll method was the
correct way to count employees. 208 The Court reasoned that the payroll
method "represents the fair reading of the statutory language" and embodied "the ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of "has an employee."209 Primary reliance on the phrase "for each working day" suggests that the employee be actually at work on a certain day, and such a
test was an improbable interpretation of remedial statutes like Title VII
and the ADEA. 210
The Supreme Court, in choosing the broader interpretation embodied
in the payroll method, recognized the remedial nature of acts like Title
VII and the ADEA while not abandoning the legislative intent embodied
in the Acts' requirements. This holding recognized that the Acts were
meant to protect workers against unlawful discrimination, and that highly
technical or superfluous interpretations had no place in interpreting antidiscrimination statutes. Holdings of courts outside the Tenth Circuit have
interpreted the requirements of anti-discrimination laws more broadly,
thus increasing the coverage of both state and federal anti-discrimination
acts.
4.

Abrogating or limiting the small employer exemption

Significant policy factors exist for abrogating or limiting the employee minimum requirement within courts of the Tenth Circuit. The determination that small employers should not be covered by acts like Title
VII was a product of legislative compromise?" There was an effort to
protect small businesses-like family owned agricultural and livestock
operations, and small family owned enterprises, who would likely hire
workers of their own ethnicity from the burdens imposed by legislative
regulation. 212 This same reasoning is the motivation behind many small
employer exemptions at the state level. 213

206.
207.
208.
209.
2 I 0.
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Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. I 983).
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Ent., 519 U.S. 202,203 (1997).
!d.
!d. at 207.
!d. at 203.
See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1337 n.4.'
See id.
See e.g. Exam Center, 994 P.2d 1261.

261]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

285

The major policy principle behind the enactment of state and federal
anti-discrimination acts was the eradication of employment discrimination in all levels of society. However, the small business exemption present in federal and state acts turns a blind eye to discrimination by small
businesses. The dissent in Exam Center stated that small employers made
up nearly seventy percent of all Utah employers, 214 leaving the majority
of Utah workers open to the very discrimination the UADA sought to
eliminate. Nationwide, similar policy reasons exist for exceptions, if not
abrogation, of small employer exemptions in anti-discrimination legislation. In 1998 there were at least 8,047,650 workers employed by
1,238,972 employers with nineteen employees or less. 215 The United
States Small Business Association estimates that twenty million small
businesses produce thirty-nine percent of our nation's GNP. 216 Thus the
small business exemption ignores at least eight million workers employed by small businesses, which are growing in number and importance. As a practical matter, state and federal legislation have different
protections for workers employed by small businesses and those employed by larger employers, which is essentially a double standard. As a
policy matter, it sends a message that though elimination of workplace
discrimination is important for some of the workforce, it is not important
enough to cover the entire workforce.
V.

CONCLUSION

Several courts within the Tenth Circuit, at both the state and federal
level, are predictably employer friendly when interpreting the requirements of state and federal anti-discrimination legislation. 217 The core policy factor behind the enactment of statutes like the EPA, Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA, was to eliminate a national history of workplace
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, national origin, disability,
and age. Legislative enactments were aimed at providing relief to those
that had historically been harmed by such discrimination. However, an
unbalanced approach toward strict statutory interpretation tends to favor
employers, often leaving employees without remedy.
There are three areas where courts within the Tenth Circuit could

214. !d. at 1269.
215. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistics about Business Sizefrom the U.S. Census Bureau: Table
2a-Employment
Size
of
Employer
Firms,
1998,
at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.htmi/#EmpSize (last visited Nov. 12, 2001 ).
216. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Mission of the U.S. Small Business Administration: Why Are Small Businesses Important?, at http://www.sba.gov/intro.html (last modified Aug. 2,
2001).
217. See supra note 7.
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give broader interpretations to legislative requirements in order to give
greater meaning to their remedial purpose. First, bright line rules concerning attorney assistance at any point of the filing process should not
be the focus when deciding whether to toll time limitations. Rather, the
focus should be the due diligence of the claimant in filing claims, the
claimant's good faith belief that such claims are well founded, whether
the employer would be prejudiced by a late filing, the overall remedial
purpose of the statutes, and consideration for the technical nature of the
filing process in light of the fact that laymen usually initiate the process.
Also, the circumstances surrounding a plaintiffs representation by counsel should be considered, although they should not be the core factor, in
deciding whether equitable tolling of the time limitations is appropriate.
Second, courts within the Tenth Circuit should look at the acts and
omissions of employers in making adverse employment decisions. Employers should not benefit from misrepresentation and concealment.
Time limits should be tolled when employers proffer pretextual reasons
for discriminatory decisions. Time limitation should trigger from the date
the employee discovers or should have reasonably discovered the discriminatory motivation.
Finally, the term "employee" should be given a broad interpretation.
Courts could implement public policy exceptions to state and federal
employee minimum requirements, thus allowing for a balance between
the eradication of employment discrimination and protection of small
businesses. Also, courts could look at the economic realities of relationships between principals and agents and not at technical or superfluous
labels. The payroll method of counting should be broadly interpreted
when counting employees. In addition, small employers should be held
to the same standards as other employers and their employees offered the
same protection afforded employees of larger employers even if there is
an abrogation or limitation of the small employer exemption. By implementing these three approaches, the remedial nature of antidiscrimination acts will be greatly enhanced, and employees will be
given a more evenhanded approach in employment discrimination suits
in state and federal courts within the Tenth Circuit.
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